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1 Introduction 
The issue of volatility of aid inflows is now becoming particularly important in view of the 
ongoing discussion and debate on how to finance the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Aid volatility, and in particular the unpredictability of aid flows, is of crucial 
importance for the attainment of the MDGs. Aid volatility and aid predictability issues have 
also been raised recently within the context of the British proposal for an International 
Finance Facility (IFF), a mechanism to frontload aid flows so that MDGs can be met by 
2015.1 Very recently, aid volatility issues have also been briefly discussed within the context 
of aid to difficult partnership countries (DPCs) in the study by Levin and Dollar (2005). 
Finally, there has been much recent debate on whether more aid can be spent effectively in 
developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, in view of potential absorptive 
capacity constraints and diminishing returns to aid.2 Despite these pressing policy questions, 
there has been surprisingly little empirical work on the measurement of aid volatility. 
Using simple measures of volatility, a few papers3 find (unsurprisingly) that aid volatility is 
bad for economic growth, ceteris paribus. Indeed, aid volatility (and aid unpredictability) can 
have important macroeconomic consequences in countries dependent on aid inflows. Lensink 
and Morrissey (2000) find that aid volatility has a significant negative impact on growth. This 
effect is robust across different country groups and different specifications in the growth 
equation. Furthermore, aid flows only have a significant positive effect on economic growth 
after conditioning on the negative impact of uncertainty. Other studies4 note that aid is often 
among the most volatile sources of foreign exchange income.5 Identifying and dealing with 
this source of uncertainty is a priority for development planning and the achievement of the 
MDGs. 
The most recent and frequently cited empirical study on the measurement of aid volatility is 
the paper by Bulíř and Hamann (2003). Using a database covering 72 countries over the 
period 1975-97, they focus on a comparative analysis of the volatility of aid flows and the 
volatility of domestic revenue in aid recipients, rather than on the volatility of aid inflows per 
se. Aid flows are more volatile than domestic fiscal revenues and tend also to be pro-cyclical; 
fiscal planners are highly uncertain of aid receipts, the information content of aid 
commitments being either very small or statistically insignificant. Finally, there are much 
larger prediction errors in programme assistance than in project aid, and a stronger tendency 
to over-estimation. 
                                                 
1  See Mavrotas (2004) for a detailed discussion and Lin and Mavrotas (2004) for a contract perspective on the 
IFF. See also Mosley (2004). 
2  See de Renzio (2005), Addison et al. (2005), Gomanee et al. (2003), Foster (2003) and Heller and Gupta 
(2002) among others. 
3  See for example Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and Bulíř and Hamann (2001, 2003).  
4  See Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) and Pallage and Robe (2001). 
5  The procyclicality of foreign aid implies inter alia that aid cannot stabilize fluctuations in consumption.   2
One drawback of much of the recent work on aid volatility is the use of a single aggregate for 
aid.6 In the present paper we measure the volatility of aid inflows by distinguishing between 
two major types of aid, namely sector-specific aid (i.e. ‘project’ aid) and non-sector allocable 
aid (‘programme’ aid) which together make more than 95 per cent of total aid flows. 
Distinguishing among different aid modalities is crucial, because different types of aid are 
likely to have different degrees of volatility.7 Different aid modalities also have different 
conditionality – see Killick (2004) and Alesina and Dollar (2000) for a comprehensive 
discussion. 
The purpose of the present paper is to determine the factors driving the cross-country 
variation in aid volatility. Our approach differs from previous studies in a number of ways. 
First, we do not treat aid as a single aggregate. Some types of aid (emergency aid and, 
arguably, programme aid) should exhibit a high degree of volatility, since they are designed to 
deal with local economic and social crises.8 Volatility in sector aid, which is designed to 
promote investment in physical and human capital, is more likely to be detrimental to long-
term economic and social development. In this paper, we focus on the volatility of two types 
of aid: sector aid and programme aid. Together, these two types make up more than 95 per 
cent of total aid volumes. Second, there has been some concern in the existing literature9 to 
ensure that the aid time series in question is stationary, and that the variance measure used to 
capture volatility is constant over time. For this reason, it is common to use an empirical filter 
(such as the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter) to extract the stochastic trend in the series. 
However, test statistics reported below indicate that our aid series are stationary. So we will 
not be filtering out any ‘permanent’ component in our series. Third, the key volatility concept 
that we will be using is that of a shock to aid, so we will condition our aid series on an 
information set of lagged macroeconomic variables. Our volatility measure is the variance of 
that part of movements in aid that are orthogonal to the information set. Finally, our study 
extends the period of analysis beyond 1997 up to 2002, incorporating more recent data on aid 
volatility.10  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with methodology and 
data issues of crucial importance in the present paper. In section 3 we discuss our empirical 
findings obtained from the estimation of a series of empirical models on the determinants of 
                                                 
6  It is notable that the frequently-cited study by Bulíř and Hamann (2003) used a single aggregate for aid to 
measure aid volatility and the distinction between programme and project aid to measure aid predictability 
but not aid volatility.  
7  The issue of aid heterogeneity has been discussed recently in Mavrotas (2002a, 2002b, 2003), Cordella and 
Dell’Ariccia (2003), Mavrotas and Ouattara (2003) and Clemens et al. (2004), although not in the context of 
aid volatility; see also Singer (1965), Cassen (1986) and White (1998) on earlier discussions on the aid 
heterogeneity issue. 
8  Food aid is also characterized by a high degree of volatility that can have important macroeconomic 
implications since the timing of food aid and its scale could be viewed as an ‘automatic stabilizer’ for the 
recipient economy in the sense that when food output in a country falls, government revenues decline and 
spending increases; monetization of food aid in this case can stabilize flows to the budget in addition to 
shielding food consumption levels in the country – see Gupta et al. (2004) for an insightful analysis. 
9  See for example Bulíř and Hamann (2003). 
10 Since the measurement of the volatility of domestic revenue and the relative volatility of aid (as in the case of 
Bulíř and Hamann, 2003), is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper, we rather focus on the volatility 
of aid flows alone.   3
aid volatility for a group of 66 countries spanning the period 1973-2002. Finally, section 4 
summarizes our empirical findings and discusses the broad policy implications of the study. 
2  Methodology and data issues 
Our data incorporate 66 countries from 1973 to 2002. The data on aid were taken from the 
OECD’s Creditor Reporting System database. This database includes the US Dollar value of 
annual overseas aid disbursed to individual recipient countries. These aid flows are 
disaggregated in various ways. Values are reported for different types of aid disbursed, 
including sector aid, programme aid and emergency aid. Corresponding annual gross national 
income data are also reported, so aid figures can be expressed as a fraction of income. We 
make use of data for all those countries in which data are available for the whole sample 
period for sector aid, programme aid and gross national income. Countries with data for 
shorter time-spans are excluded, because such data would be inadequate for the time-series 
analysis described below. None of the countries is a micro-state, so small country bias is 
unlikely to be a problem.11 




i / GNIjt, i = {PROJECT, PROGRAMME}; j = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T (1) 
 
where AIDjt
i measures the disbursement of type-i aid to j in year t, and GNIjt is j’s gross 
national income in year t. All quantities are measured in current US Dollars. We use gross 
national income instead of gross domestic product because there are a few countries in our 
data set (for example, Swaziland) for which migrant remittances are substantial relative to 
domestic production. Donors are likely to regard these remittances as part of the country’s 
resources. It turns out that the distribution of zjt
i in most countries is heavily left-skewed, 
because of occasional donations that are much larger than is typical. A variance-based 
measure of volatility is more likely to be meaningful if it is taken from a symmetric 
distribution, so we will use a transformation of zjt
i that is approximately symmetrical in the 
countries in our data set. This is12 
 
 x jt
i = ln(Σt zjt
i
 / T + zjt
i) (2) 
 
                                                 
11 Only two countries have a 2002 gross national income less than US$500mn. These are the Gambia 
(US$380mn) and the Solomon Islands (US$240mn). Excluding these two countries makes no substantial 
difference to our results. 
12 The obvious alternative to this is ln(z), but this variable tends to be right-skewed in many countries.   4
The 66 countries in the data set for which observations of xjt
i are available for 1973-2002 are 
listed in Table 1a. Among the countries in the table there is a wide variation in the importance 
of aid as a fraction of national income, a point to which we will return later. The table shows 
that there is a negative correlation between mean total aid flows as a proportion of gross 
national income and the unconditional variance of xjt
i.13 In order to interpret this 
phenomenon, it is important to remember that the logarithmic transformation means that xjt
i 
measures the proportional (not the absolute) variation in aid flows. The proportional variation 
is higher among countries where aid flows are typically very small, but where there is 
occasionally a moderate aid inflow that is very large relative to the average for these 
countries. 
This paper will not deal directly with the analysis of emergency aid. However, Table 1b 
provides some comparable summary statistics relating to emergency aid in those countries 
where it has ever constituted more than 1 per cent of national income in a single year. Here 
there is a weak positive correlation between the volatility measures and aid flows as a 
proportion of national income. This suggests that the characteristics of emergency aid are 
rather different from those of sector and programme aid. However, there are too few countries 
in which emergency aid has been a substantial proportion of national income for us to apply 
the methodology discussed below to this aid category. 
If Dickey-Fuller test statistics (with an intercept but no trend) are computed for xjt
i in these 
countries over 1974-2002, then the average value of the DF t-statistic is -3.933 for project aid 
and -3.376 for programme aid. These figures are large enough to reject the joint null that the 
series are I(1) (see Im et al., 2003). We will proceed on the assumption that xjt
i is stationary. 
The fact that previous authors such as Bulíř and Hamann (2003) have not been able to reject 
the null of non-stationarity may reflect some aggregation bias in the total aid figures. If there 
is some heterogeneity in the data generating processes for aid of different types, then 
stationarity tests for total aid will have low power. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The cross-country correlation between the logarithm of the unconditional variance of x
SECTOR and the 
logarithm of average AID/GNI is -0.465 (t = -4.204). For x
PROGRAMME the figure is -0.431 (t = -3.822).   5
Table 1a. Average aid as a fraction of GNI and unconditional aid volatility measures, in per cent 
  AID/GNI   var(x
SECTOR)   var(x
PROGRAMME)     AID/GNI   var(x
SECTOR) var(x
PROGRAMME) 
Mexico 0.06  18.54  50.72  El  Salvador  4.70  12.54  34.16 
Brazil  0.06   9.10  32.65  Botswana  4.73   9.69  35.71 
Argentina 0.07  24.89 45.63  Jordan 5.04  12.84  37.14 
Trinidad 0.20  16.33  53.85  Egypt  5.24    6.88  26.19 
Uruguay 0.21  31.13  43.70  Bangladesh 5.29    5.51  19.14 
Chile 0.24  23.79  31.37  Belize  5.33    3.38  15.49 
Algeria 0.29  14.23  38.71  Kenya 6.65  16.82  48.16 
Colombia 0.34  13.56 17.91  Haiti  7.12    5.35  15.47 
Turkey  0.43  12.70  32.55  Sri Lanka  7.16   5.31   7.71 
Malaysia 0.58  19.10 44.74  Honduras  7.36    6.63 18.89 
Panama 0.86  21.91  45.14  Central  African Rep.  7.61   6.60  24.87 
Syria 0.89  25.89  39.66  Bolivia 7.69    4.81  30.02 
Thailand  0.92   5.48  36.44  Madagascar  7.87   7.63  17.77 
India  1.00   4.21  15.90  Nepal  8.15   4.88  27.16 
Peru  1.14   8.27  20.34  Ghana  8.21   4.75  22.61 
Gabon 1.31  10.38  44.74  Benin  8.42    9.62  21.20 
Guatemala 1.37    7.92  30.22 Senegal  8.42    3.97  26.20 
Paraguay 1.37  12.50 32.15  Togo  8.74    3.80  17.61 
Fiji  1.45   9.37  28.57  Suriname  8.82   9.17  31.52 
Morocco 1.46    4.29 16.09  Chad  9.32  29.22  50.36 
Dominican Rep.  1.58   7.50  28.09 Niger  9.72    9.72  16.45 
Indonesia 1.75    4.86  16.32  Papua  New Guinea  10.05   4.69  15.73 
Philippines 1.86    7.55  26.09  Burkina  11.36  11.80  20.69   6
Table 1a continued               
  AID/GNI   var(x
SECTOR)   var(x
PROGRAMME)     AID/GNI   var(x
SECTOR) var(x
PROGRAMME) 
Tunisia  2.33   5.20  14.73  Burundi  11.78   2.12  14.39 
Costa Rica  2.37  10.62  46.46 Rwanda  11.91    7.62  31.86 
Sudan 2.94  15.53  18.74  Mauritania 13.14    3.06  26.44 
Pakistan  3.44   5.56  14.63  Mali  13.20   6.61  11.58 
Congo Rep.  3.71   9.93  43.01  Sierra Leone  14.41   3.53  11.64 
Cameroon 3.79    4.24  31.42  Zambia  14.53  15.06  30.04 
Dem. Rep. of Congo  3.83  17.70 30.26  Guyana  16.27  10.31 18.02 
Swaziland 3.87  13.10  40.13  Gambia  16.35  17.12  31.20 
Jamaica  3.91  12.54  20.35  Solomon Is.  17.53   8.63  26.96 
Ivoire 4.08  18.54  50.72  Malawi  17.66    9.92  30.96 
             
mean Africa  7.90  9.96  28.15 
mean Asia  4.37  9.11  25.92 
mean Latin America   3.38  12.89  31.53 
             
mean of countries with AID/GNI < 5%  12.65  32.39  mean of countries with AID/GNI > 5%  8.15  23.54   7
Table 1b. Average emergency aid as a fraction of GNI and its unconditional volatility, in per cent 
  Emergency 
AID/GNI  var(x
EMERG)    Emergency 
AID/GNI  var(x
EMERG) 
Guyana 0.06  39.07  Malawi  0.30  33.03 
El Salvador  0.14  30.25  Dem. Rep. of Congo  0.33  38.98 
Niger 0.16  31.60  Honduras  0.34  43.73 
Bolivia 0.17  42.66  Gambia  0.42  37.49 
Mali 0.23  37.27  Burundi 1.33  43.57 
Chad 0.24  32.85  Rwanda 1.64  42.24 
Mauritania 0.28  32.03  Sierra  Leone  1.65  45.40 
The table reports figures only for those countries in which annual emergency aid has ever been more than 1% of 
GNI in a single year. 
3 Empirical  analysis 
3.1 Measuring  aid  shocks 
The next step in the analysis is to create a measure of aid shocks. In order to do this, we fit 
vector autoregression (VAR) for each country of the form14 
 
 β  j (L) xjt =  ujt (3) 
 
where xjt = [xjt
SECTOR, xjt
PROGRAMME, yjt]’ and ujt is a vector of independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) residuals. yjt is the logarithm of GNIjt deflated by the deflator for world aid 
in the UN data set.  
Because in our sample N > T, it is not possible to estimate equation (3) for all the countries 
simultaneously by Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimator (SURE); the results below are 
based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for each country separately. 
Nevertheless, it is of some interest whether the ujt are correlated across the cross-section, that 
is, whether shocks to aid are correlated across countries. Table 2 provides some evidence on 
this question. The table reports the average size of the shocks ujt
SECTOR and ujt
PROGRAMME (in 
other words, Σj ujt
SECTOR/N and Σj ujt
PROGRAMME/N) for each t. For ujt
SECTOR and u jt
PROGRAMME 
individually, the table also reports an F-statistic to test the joint null hypothesis that these 
averages are all equal to zero. The fact that the null is rejected in both cases indicates some 
correlation of shocks across countries. However, the common shocks only make up on 
average about 2-3 per cent of the total shocks to an individual country. The same exercise is 
                                                 
14 In the reported results, the lag order of the VAR is 2 and the sample is 1975-2002. Higher order lags are not 
statistically significant.   8
carried out for the variance measures ln(Σj [ujt
SECTOR]
2/N) and ln(Σj [ujt
PROGRAMME]
2/N), with 
similar results. So there is some cross-country correlation in aid shocks, but of a magnitude 
that is small relative to the variance of each element of ujt. 
Our main results deal with the cross-country determinants of the variance of ujt
i. The measure 
of volatility for each type of aid (i) in each country (j) is Σt (ujt
i)
2 /
 T. Table 3 reports these 
figures for each of the 66 countries in our data set. As noted in the table, the cross-country 
correlation of the two aid volatility series (0.626) is significantly different from both zero and 
unity. So sector aid volatility is positively correlated with programme aid volatility. We shall 
see some of the reasons for this in due course. Because a large part of the movement in actual 




 T and var(xjt
i). Across the whole sample, the correlation coefficient for sector aid is 
0.828; for programme aid it is 0.700. 
One might wonder how much of the variance in xjt
i is due to volatility in the denominator 
GNIjt. If this is an important factor, then our measure will not be a very accurate measure of 
aid volatility. In order to check this, we construct an alternative aid measure zjt
i* in which 
GNIjt is replaced by its (country-specific) Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. There is a high 
correlation between the corresponding transformed series xjt
i* and the original xjt
i. For sector 
aid, the country-specific correlation coefficients range from 0.920 to 0.996; the corresponding 
figures for programme aid are 0.985 and 0.998. In other words, almost all of the variation in 
xjt
i is coming from the variation in AIDjt
i. In the results reported below we use xjt
i rather than 
xjt
i*, but it makes little difference to the results.   9
















1975    6.402   -6.058   -4.679   -3.640 
1976    -9.962  -10.734   -3.456   -3.576 
1977    -0.377   -6.556   -4.399   -3.870 
1978    -4.185   -5.721   -4.399   -4.825 
1979    2.379   0.727   -4.188   -3.827 
1980   -5.013    -1.074    -4.717    -3.729 
1981   -3.024    -6.162    -4.292    -3.650 
1982   0.458    3.505    -4.685    -3.978 
1983   1.601    0.417    -4.970    -3.695 
1984   3.226    0.772    -4.193    -3.519 
1985   0.906    14.374    -4.354    -3.307 
1986   -0.807    3.563    -4.072    -3.707 
1987   -5.902    12.369    -4.809    -3.307 
1988   5.891    6.226    -4.117    -2.903 
1989   7.814    11.291    -3.734    -2.864 
1990   -0.408    10.876    -4.104    -3.144 
1991   1.007    1.285    -4.390    -3.367 
1992   2.474    7.506    -4.333    -2.756 
1993   2.422    0.350    -4.194    -3.161 
1994   -0.290    -11.521    -4.149    -2.849 
1995   0.133    2.790    -4.190    -3.450 
1996   -2.019    -2.621    -4.197    -4.045 
1997   -4.400    -11.414    -4.222    -3.557 
1998   -2.815    -8.895    -4.212    -4.265 
1999   -1.415    -4.066    -4.075    -3.649 
2000   6.078    4.123    -4.324    -3.470 
2001   2.817    2.774    -4.084    -3.614 
2002   -2.991    -8.128    -4.659    -3.745 




by year effects  




1.822   2.351   1.186   2.492   10
Table 3. Conditional aid volatility (mean squared regression residuals, ∑t [ujt
i]
2/T) 
  sector  programme    sector  programme    sector  programme 
Burkina  0.0116 0.0787   Haiti  0.0358  0.0677   Gabon  0.0634  0.3161 
Bangladesh 0.0157  0.0203    Papua  New  Guinea 0.0358 0.0764    Peru  0.0689 0.1200 
Senegal  0.0184 0.1112   Ghana  0.0359  0.1961   Solomon  Is.  0.0694  0.1340 
Madagascar 0.0200  0.1908    Philippines 0.0366 0.0880    Guatemala  0.0728 0.0503 
Egypt 0.0202  0.0302    Gambia  0.0408  0.1260   Congo  Rep.  0.0751  0.2695 
India 0.0205  0.0413    Nepal  0.0413 0.1583    Togo  0.0812 0.1936 
Jordan 0.0214  0.0853    Sudan  0.0415  0.0630   Colombia  0.0826  0.0991 
Zambia  0.0225 0.1259   Indonesia  0.0440  0.1099   Chile  0.0870  0.1597 
Rwanda 0.0238  0.1691    El  Salvador  0.0441 0.0576    Paraguay  0.0954 0.2679 
Cameroon 0.0248  0.0888    Tunisia  0.0446 0.0561    Turkey  0.0971 0.1163 
Pakistan  0.0252 0.0570   Burundi  0.0469  0.1872   Swaziland  0.0996  0.2928 
Malawi  0.0264 0.1377   Thailand  0.0474  0.2720   Guyana  0.1017  0.1058 
Central African Rep.  0.0286  0.2199    Ivoire  0.0488 0.0971    Algeria  0.1080 0.2192 
Morocco 0.0295  0.0880    Costa  Rica  0.0509 0.0624    Belize  0.1163 0.3384 
Benin 0.0296  0.1168    Dominican  Rep.  0.0533  0.1528    Dem. Rep. of Congo  0.1200  0.2438 
Sri  Lanka  0.0297 0.0374   Fiji  0.0535  0.1931   Trinidad  0.1260  0.4037 
Mali  0.0305 0.0694   Brazil  0.0536  0.1755   Mexico  0.1283  0.2841 
Mauritania 0.0309  0.1083    Chad  0.0550 0.0650    Syria  0.1388 0.2431 
Kenya 0.0327  0.1158    Honduras  0.0552 0.0866    Argentina  0.1390 0.2646 
Jamaica 0.0331  0.1122    Suriname  0.0590 0.3346    Panama  0.1511 0.3209 
Niger  0.0349 0.0660   Bolivia  0.0621  0.0680   Malaysia  0.1601  0.4062 
Botswana 0.0358  0.1700    Sierra  Leone  0.0629 0.1338    Uruguay  0.1753 0.2911 
Countries are listed in ascending order of sector volatility. The coefficient of correlation of the logs of the two series is 0.626 (t = 6.419).   11
3.2  Modelling the cross-country variation in aid volatility 
The next part of our analysis explores the cross-country variation in the conditional variance 
of xjt
i. We hypothesize that the following factors could affect the uncertainty of aid flows. 
1.  The size of aid flows. Countries with larger average aid inflows are probably receiving 
aid for a relatively high number of schemes. By the law of large numbers, the 
proportional variation in the total inflow is likely to be lower. (Unless the shocks to 
aid coming in on different schemes are perfectly correlated, a larger number of 
schemes implies a smaller aggregate shock, relative to the average aid volume for the 
country.) This effect could relate to the total value of total aid inflows, but if the size 
of individual schemes depends on country size, so individual schemes tend to be 
smaller in small countries, the relevant measure will be aid inflows as a fraction of 
national income. 
2.  Per capita income. Richer countries could attract a less stable commitment from 
donors, and so face more aid volatility. Indeed, we would expect aid to middle-income 
countries to be more variable than aid to low-income countries since (i) aid flows to 
middle-income countries are more likely to depend on geo-strategic and political 
concerns of donors than on goals based on poverty reduction, and these two factors are 
more prone to change from year to year than recipients' GDP per capita, and 
(ii)  middle-income countries are more prone to balance-of-payments shocks and 
donors are likely to be more exposed to risk in these countries than in low-income 
countries (Levin and Dollar, 2005). 
3.  Institutional quality. Countries with higher-quality institutions may be better able to 
maintain good working relationships with donors, reducing aid volatility. 
4.  Policy regime. Countries with a ‘better’ policy regime (i.e., one more favoured by 
donors) may attract more aid, but these aid flows may be more volatile. For example, a 
(permanent) improvement in the policy regime may be rewarded by a temporary 
increase in aid. 
Measurement of (1) and (2) above is relatively straightforward. For each of the 66 countries, 
we will capture (1) by two variables. The first is ln([Σi AIDj73
i] / GNIj73), that is, the log of the 
ratio of total initial (1973) aid to gross national income. This is abbreviated to ln(AID / GNI) 
in the tables below. The second is country size, measured as total initial national income, 
ln(GNIj73), abbreviated to ln(GNI) in the tables. Together, the two variables allow for aid 
volatility to depend on both aid as a fraction of national income, and the absolute size of aid 
inflows. Initial, rather than average, aid volumes are used because of the potential 
endogeneity of mean aid flows to their variance. Similarly, per capita income is measured as 
ln(GNIj73 / POPj73), where POPj73 is the initial (1973) population level reported for country j 
in the UN dataset. The tables refer to this variable as ln(GNI / POP).  
For measures of institutional quality, we rely on the 2002 World Bank governance indicators 
reported and discussed in Kaufmann et al. (2003).15 These are scores for: ‘voice and 
                                                 
15 Such indicators are not available all the way back to the 1970s, so we must acknowledge a caveat that there 
may be some measurement error here.   12
accountability’, ‘government effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘control of 
corruption’. We will remain agnostic about which specific measure best captures those 
institutional factors that make it easier for a donor to deal with a recipient government, and so 
reduce the volatility of aid flows. As Table 4 indicates, all of the measures are highly 
correlated with each other in our sample. For this reason we will fit five separate regression 
equations, each including one of the indicators. The variables are indicated in the tables below 
by, respectively, voice, effectiveness, regulation, law and corruption.  
 













   
regulatory  0.7078 0.8537     
law  0.6817 0.9054 0.8357   
corruption  0.6057 0.8533 0.7936 0.8790 
 
The policy regime variable could be measured in a number of ways. The results reported 
below make use of the Dollar and Kraay (2003) openness index, averaged over 1969-99 (the 
longest available time period). This index, listed as openness in the tables below, has the 
advantage that it has broader country coverage than most others – 63 out of 66 countries in 
our sample16 – and that it manifests a reasonably high in-sample variation. By contrast other 
openness measures, such as the Sachs-Warner index, are zero for most of our countries for 
most years. 
In order to make use of the full sample of 66 countries, we will also fit a regression equation 
in which openness is replaced by a slightly more crude measure of openness: that is, the ratio 
of the value of total trade to GDP, averaged over 1973-2002 (the longest available time 
period), taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
We will also allow for regional variations in the level of aid volatility. Latin America lies 
mostly in the American sphere of influence, Africa mostly in the Anglo-French sphere of 
influence. Geo-political factors may impact on donors’ aid commitments, so we include a 
dummy for Latin American countries (LAj), and a dummy for African countries (AFj). The 





 T) = α0 + α1•ln(AIDj73 / GNIj73) + α2•ln(GNIj73 / POPj73) + α3•ln(GNIj73)     (4) 
 +  α4•qj + α5•opennessj + α6•LAj + α7•AFj + vj 
                                                 
16 The exceptions are Sudan, Suriname and the Solomon Islands.   13
where vj is a cross-sectional residual and qj is one of the institutional quality indicators. Note 
the logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable, which ensures that it is 
approximately normally distributed in the cross section. This equation is fitted to the smaller, 
63-country sample for both types of aid (sector and programme); Table 5 reports these 
regressions results, from ten regression equations, for two types of aid and five governance 
indicators. Coefficients significant at at least the 10 per cent level are indicated in bold. 
There is a large and statistically significant negative coefficient on (AIDj73  /  GNIj73): the 
unconditional correlation between aid volumes and our volatility measure evident in Table 1 
is also present when volatility is conditioned on other factors. However, our openness 
measure is quite highly (negatively) correlated with ln(GNIj73), so neither the positive 
coefficient on openness nor the negative coefficient on ln(GNIj73) is individually significant in 
the sector aid volatility equations; nor is (GNIj73 / POPj73). It turns out that the regression 
specification that minimizes standard information criteria – such as the Schwartz-Bayesian or 
the Akaike information criterion – is the one that omits ln(GNIj73) and (GNIj73 / POPj73). Such 
a specification is reported in Table 6. The openness measure is statistically significant in all of 
the Table 6 regressions, with a coefficient ranging from around 0.35 to 0.40, depending on the 
governance measure used. This result is consistent with the conjecture that more open 
economies have more volatile sector aid. More open economies tend to be smaller and richer, 
ceteris paribus, and they also tend to have more variable sector aid flows. The coefficients on 
all of the governance indicators are significantly negative, with values ranging from –0.2 to 
-0.35. The largest coefficients and t-ratios are for voice and regulation, although it would be 
unwise to try to draw too much from these differences in a small sample. 
The  openness measure is statistically significant in none of the programme aid volatility 
equations in Table 5; nor does it appear in any regression specification that minimizes the 
Schwartz-Bayesian or Akaike information criterion. Moreover, none of the coefficients on the 
governance variables is significantly different from zero. The quality of the recipient’s 
political institutions seems to affect the stability of sector aid, but not that of programme aid. 
This reinforces the impression that recipients’ political institutions and economic policy are 
not necessarily important factors in the determination of programme aid volatility. 
Nevertheless, there are significant negative coefficients on ln(GNIj73) and ln(AIDj73 / GNIj73). 
On average, large and aid-dependent countries have lower levels of programme aid volatility, 
as they do of sector aid volatility. This explains the positive correlation between the volatility 
measures for the two kinds of aid. 
Table 7 reports the results from regression equations that replicate those in Table 6, but with 
the openness variable replaced by the share of trade in GDP, for the full 66-country sample. 
The table shows that the results do not depend a great deal on which measure of openness is 
used. Coefficient values and levels of significance are very similar. 
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Table 5. Cross section regressions for conditional aid volatility (63 countries) 
Dependent variable: log of mean squared residual from sector aid equation, ln(∑t [ujt
SECTOR]
2/T) 
  coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t  
intercept  -1.951  -4.438  -1.893  -4.018  -1.839  -3.881  -1.916  -4.180  -1.907  -4.050 
ln(GNI)  -0.066  -1.235  -0.066  -1.158  -0.081  -1.413  -0.055  -0.987  -0.061  -1.059 
ln(GNI/POP)   0.168   1.002   0.198   1.051   0.181   0.973   0.172   0.977   0.200   1.064 
ln(AID/GNI)  -0.210  -3.078  -0.205  -2.771  -0.228  -3.133  -0.213  -2.999  -0.207  -2.795 
AF  -0.299  -1.855  -0.258  -1.490  -0.218  -1.281  -0.289  -1.706  -0.284  -1.606 
LA   0.381   2.105   0.147   0.757   0.176   0.918   0.273   1.481   0.138   0.709 
voice  -0.355  -3.470                 
law      -0.217  -1.846             
corruption          -0.206  -1.789         
regulation              -0.332  -2.585     
effectiveness               -0.229  -1.853 
openness   0.219   1.532   0.192   1.257   0.174   1.135   0.258   1.711   0.198   1.292 
                    
R squared     0.612     0.554     0.552     0.578     0.554 
σ     0.431     0.461     0.462     0.449     0.461 
Schwartz  Criterion  -1.295  -1.157  -1.154  -1.212   -1.158 
Akaike  Criterion  -1.567  -1.429  -1.426  -1.484   -1.430 
Normality (χ
2(2))   1.106     0.208     0.098     0.442     0.173 
Heterosk. (F(12,42))   0.806     0.998     0.854     1.104     1.034 
RESET (F(1,54))   0.295     1.379     0.812     1.244     0.882 
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Table 5 continued 
Dependent variable: log of mean squared residual from programme aid equation, ln(∑t [ujt
PROGRAMME]
2/T) 
  coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t  
intercept  -0.389  -0.677  -0.374  -0.648  -0.356  -0.615  -0.381  -0.660  -0.377  -0.655 
ln(GNI)  -0.153  -2.195  -0.153  -2.184  -0.158  -2.247  -0.152  -2.159  -0.150  -2.139 
ln(GNI/POP)   0.181   0.827   0.195   0.848   0.192   0.843   0.175   0.787   0.206   0.894 
ln(AID/GNI)  -0.230  -2.587  -0.228  -2.513  -0.235  -2.640  -0.233  -2.606  -0.226  -2.502 
AF   0.052   0.244   0.058   0.273   0.069   0.333   0.063   0.296   0.042   0.196 
LA  -0.073  -0.307  -0.135  -0.570  -0.128  -0.545  -0.103  -0.446  -0.146  -0.612 
voice  -0.087  -0.652                 
law      -0.066  -0.456             
corruption          -0.066  -0.467         
regulation              -0.052  -0.318     
effectiveness               -0.089  -0.588 
openness   0.137   0.731   0.130   0.696   0.124   0.664   0.140   0.738   0.132   0.708 
                    
R squared     0.360     0.358     0.358     0.357     0.359 
σ     0.563     0.565     0.565     0.565     0.564 
Schwartz  Criterion  -0.757   -0.753  -0.753  -0.752   -0.756 
Akaike  Criterion  -1.029   -1.025  -1.025  -1.023   -1.028 
Normality (χ
2(2))   1.746     1.601     1.726     1.580     1.313 
Heterosk. F(12,42))   0.586     0.994     0.753     0.721     0.866 
RESET (F(1,54))   0.771     1.078     0.861     1.015     1.033 
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Table 6. Restricted cross section regressions for conditional sector aid volatility (63 countries) 
Dependent variable: log of mean squared residual from sector aid equation, ln(∑t [ujt
SECTOR]
2/T) 
  coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t 
intercept  -2.434  -12.28  -2.384  -11.05  -2.436  -11.40  -2.321  -10.97  -2.360  -10.83 
ln(AID/GNI)  -0.228  -5.411  -0.233  -5.086  -0.239  -5.086  -0.239  -5.390  -0.238  -5.147 
AF  -0.282  -1.831  -0.241  -1.434  -0.186  -1.148  -0.282  -1.732  -0.269  -1.560 
LA   0.483   2.942   0.266   1.566   0.298   1.761   0.369   2.249   0.255   1.496 
voice  -0.350  -3.479                 
law      -0.196  -1.800             
corruption          -0.179  -1.620         
regulation              -0.326  -2.657     
effectiveness                  -0.208  -1.843 
openness   0.364   3.418   0.350   3.847   0.333   3.731   0.398   4.339   0.353   3.871 
                    
R squared     0.599     0.541     0.567     0.539     0.535 
σ     0.430    0.460     0.447     0.460     0.463 
Schwartz Criterion  -1.394    -1.259    -1.318    -1.256    -1.246 
Akaike Criterion  -1.598    -1.463    -1.522    -1.461    -1.450 
Normality (χ
2(2))   0.553     0.076     0.256     0.068     0.023 
Heterosk. (F(8,48))   0.600     0.663     0.634     0.630     0.506 
RESET (F(1,56))   0.417     0.322     0.599     0.615     0.153 
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Table 7. Restricted cross section regressions for conditional sector aid volatility using the alternative openness indicator (66 countries) 
Dependent variable: log of mean squared residual from sector aid equation, ln(∑t [ujt
SECTOR]
2/T) 
  coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t   coeff.  t 
intercept  -4.875  -10.99  -4.809  -10.12  -4.845  -10.09  -4.970 -10.70  -4.908 -10.44 
ln(AID/GNI)  -0.231  -5.405  -0.243  -5.326  -0.252  -5.391  -0.259 -5.752  -0.259 -5.606 
AF  -0.119  -0.812  -0.077  -0.510  -0.029  -0.195  -0.063 -0.434  -0.105 -0.702 
LA   0.572   3.500   0.381   2.368   0.417   2.601   0.507   3.169   0.377   2.385 
voice  -0.313  -3.107                 
law      -0.223  -2.047             
corruption          -0.233  -2.092         
regulation              -0.331 -2.859     
effectiveness                  -0.278 -2.519 
trade share  0.470   4.281   0.464   3.934   0.465   3.953   0.497   4.332   0.491   4.186 
                    
R squared     0.551     0.513     0.515     0.542      0.529  
σ     0.445    0.463     0.462     0.449     0.455 
Schwartz Criterion  -1.336    -1.254    -1.257    -1.314    -1.287 
Akaike Criterion  -1.535    -1.453    -1.456    -1.513    -1.486 
Normality (χ
2(2))   1.687     1.030     0.914     1.124     1.008 
Heterosk. (F(8,51))   0.638     0.546     0.566     0.560     0.700 
RESET (F(1,59))   0.171     2.395     0.953     2.485     1.900 
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4  Conclusions and broad policy implications 
In this paper we have examined aid volatility using data for 66 aid recipients over the 
period 1973-2002. Our work improves upon earlier work in this important area by 
distinguishing total aid inflows into sector and programme aid and by adopting a 
different methodology in capturing aid volatility. The key volatility concept that we 
employ is that of a shock to aid, that is, the part of aid flows that is orthogonal to an 
information set of lagged macroeconomic variables. 
We find that sector aid volatility is positively correlated with programme aid volatility. 
Moreover, a 1 per cent increase in aid as a proportion of GNI is associated with a fall in 
our conditional sector aid volatility measure of around 0.16-0.17 per cent, and that a 
1 per cent increase in per capita income is associated with a rise in volatility of around 
0.35-0.40 per cent. Similar results appear in the case of programme aid volatility, 
despite the fact that programme aid is rather more volatile – as we measure it – than 
project assistance. (However, in interpreting these figures it is important to remember 
that volatility is measured in terms of the percentage changes in aid flows, not in terms 
of changes in absolute size, which are asymmetrically distributed.) Furthermore, the 
institutional quality of the aid recipient seems to promote stability of sector aid. We also 
find that more open economies, which tend to be smaller and richer, ceteris paribus, 
experience more volatile sector aid flows. Finally, our empirical results indicate that the 
quality of institutions and the degree of openness in aid recipients are not important 
factors concerning the volatility of programme assistance. 
Our results point to the importance of aid heterogeneity in explaining the volatility of 
aid inflows. This has crucial policy implications with respect to progress towards 
achievement of the MDGs, since the differing degrees of volatility would not be 
apparent if a single aggregate for aid were employed. This is particularly important for 
aid recipient governments who are attempting to manage aid volatility by some 
combination of adjustment to tax and spending plans, adjustment of foreign exchange 
reserves or domestic non-monetary financing.17 For these countries, improved 
forecasting of both short-term and medium-term aid is also crucial. (Although in the 
latter case informal indications from donors are also likely to be essential.) Our results 
emphasize the importance for donors of speedy implementation of the Rome 
Declaration on Aid Harmonization, which will lead to substantial reductions in aid 
volatility. More generally, it is imperative that donors explore new sources of financing 
accompanied by less volatility (for example, the IFF) so that the MDGs can be attained 
by 2015. 
A number of research questions remain unresolved, and could be pursued through a 
combination of econometric analysis and case-study. Among the more important of 
these is the impact of the volatility of sector and programme aid on a recipient’s budget 
and on economic growth in low-income countries. 
                                                 
17 See Bulíř and Lane (2002) and Foster (2003) for a comprehensive discussion.   19
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